Showing posts with label Checklists. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Checklists. Show all posts

Friday, August 17, 2012

The Mad Men MBA: A 4-Part Framework for Really Understanding Companies


My friend Doug is on a mission to get my wife and me watching Mad Men. It would seem we're the last denizens of earth still holding out. His latest tactic has won me over. Doug has proposed using the various companies featured in each episode as case studies for the good, the bad, and the ugly of businesses. He had me at case study. 

So what he proposed with such friendly intent, I've expanded with a barrage of verbosity. I've agreed to his proposal (and we'll borrow his box set of seasons 1-4), and countered with this suggestion that we employ a specific framework for our analysis, one that I use for investment valuations and that I believe forces you to truly understand a business. 

For these purposes, I've dubbed it the Mad Men MBA, and below is the framework I proposed via email.

Provided it doesn't send him running for an escape, perhaps we'll feature one or two of the case studies in a Mad Men MBA series here on the Adjacent Progression. 

Ok, Doug, let's up the ante on the Mad Men MBA discussions. When evaluating any business, whether to invest in it or just to understand it a bit better, it helps to have a framework. A framework organizes your thoughts, lets you sift through the information in a systematic way, and gets you pretty close to making valid comparisons between companies. Without a framework you can pick up bits and pieces of what's good or bad about a company, but unless you have some way to organize all the information you're taking in...it tends to float around in disconnected ways. That's how it works for me at least. A framework helps me retain information, shift it around while looking at its different angles, understand it deeply, and ultimately turn it into a base of knowledge I can build on. 

The great hope is that accumulating knowledge can eventually lead to wisdom. Sweet, sweet wisdom. 

So, grasshopper, here is my suggestion for a framework, posed in the form of questions to ask about each company featured on Mad Men...

1. What is the nature of the company's earnings?

This question forces you to go to the heart of a company's prospects, asking hard questions about the demand for its products or services and the potential for growth. It also forces you to consider whether your starting point (the financial results of a given year) are an aberration from the norm or a signal that a new trend is taking effect. 

Some businesses have cyclical earnings demonstrated by high peaks and low troughs of demand. This makes their earnings really high some years and really low others. Auto companies (the Jaguar discussion from Mad Men) tend to have cyclical ties to the economy. When it's good, they kill it. When it's bad, they have a hard time scaling back operations to meet the decline in demand...they hemorrhage money.

Some business depend on blockbuster success. Think movies, music, video games, even toys. They will have huge earnings in a year when they have a blockbuster seller, but then drop off precipitously if they can't produce another blockbuster. For movies, you have a lot of production companies working on the next hit, but a disproportionate amount of the money goes to only a handful of successes. Economist (and fitness guru) Art DeVany did some research that demonstrated that it's virtually impossible to predict what movies will be huge successes and which will be bombs...even for the studios themselves. 

You have businesses whose earnings are declining over time because technology or habits have just passed them by. (Think GameStop...at some point even the most graphic intensive video games will be played via the internet - and probably on iPhones - rather than on consoles.)

You have businesses whose earnings just stay the same. They're neither growing or shrinking. They have their niche, they make a set profit from it, and they just keep plugging along.

And you have businesses whose earnings are growing over time. The growth companies. Either demand is increasing for their products/services, or they're expanding into adjacent markets, or they're raising prices to generate more profits, or they're reducing costs to generate more profits. 

(Also, see here for a discussion of Owner Earnings, an incredibly important concept to understand as part of the framework.)

2. What competitive advantages exist to protect those earnings against foes trying to steal the company's customers?

This is the most important piece of the framework. In a free market, there is vicious competition for profit. And when a business pops up, demonstrating an ability to make tidy profits, it's only a matter of time before bigger, faster, smarter competitors start gunning for them. They will build similar products, they will undercut pricing, they will exclude them from distribution networks...anything to steal their customers and take those profits for themselves.

So, what competitive advantage (or "advantages" plural...the more it has, the better) does the business have that makes it difficult for bigger, faster, smarter competitors to steal customers? The four main categories are these:

a. Low-Cost, Low-Price. Think Southwest Airlines (or Amazon, or Costco). Customers prefer paying less instead of more. (So if you're charging a higher price than your competitor, you better give them a really good reason to pay more.) Companies possessing this competitive advantage usually have some sort of scale benefit from being large. They've passed that tipping point where they can produce more of a product and thereby do it for less on a per unit basis. The best of these are fanatical about keeping costs down and equally fanatical about passing the cost savings on to customers in the form of lowest prices (think Sam Walton).

b. Network Effects/Customer Captivity. It's a matter of making your product or service "sticky" so customers either can't or don't want to leave you. Facebook is the textbook example of this right now, and the case is made when you compare it to what Google is trying to accomplish with Google+. It's arguably a better service, but not enough people use it to get other people using it. Google can't pull people from Facebook because that's where all their friends are. And all their friends are there because all their friends are there. They're stuck! That makes it really hard for Google to make inroads.

My favorite example, however, is online banking with their billpay features. I have stuck it out for way too long with a bank whose other services I can't stand because I didn't want to go through the hassle of switching my bills over. That's a sticky feature.

c. Brand. This is the hardest to define, but you tend to know it when you see it. The hallmark of a great brand is that have such an emotional connection to it that they'll pay a premium to buy the product over a competitor's offering that costs much less. Coke and Apple come to mind for consumer brands. IBM has a powerful brand in corporate IT. A great test of a brand is how well its products do when it gets serious competition from a lower priced competitor. There's a great case study of Richard Branson trying to make Virgin Cola a legitimate contender against Coke and Pepsi. As we know, he failed. It's hard to take on established brands. 

d. Legal Protections. It's always a nice advantage when the government tells your competitors they aren't allowed to go after your customers (legalized monopolies like local cable providers), or you have airtight patent protection for your product (pharma), or you have exclusive rights to an asset like FCC-managed bandwidth (local tv franchises). 

The big debate about competitive advantage is how and whether innovation fits on here. It is, unquestionably, a competitive advantage. Apple is the best example. (See my previous write-ups here, here, and here.) They have a long string of innovation successes that have differentiated their products from the competition, allowed them to charge a premium, and made them amazingly profitable. But how durable is that advantage? Innovation is very, very hard to sustain over long periods of time. Competition will study your success, and they will eventually figure out how to do it. If your earnings depend on constant innovation (as tends to be the case in consumer electronics) - and you don't have other forms of competitive advantage protecting you - I don't call that a durable advantage. You'll stumble at some point. 

3. Does the economic model of the business work?

This is where you get more into the finance and accounting stuff. Basically, you want to know if the basic economics of the business make sense. The questions seem almost too elementary, but you have to ask them. If you're considering an investment in the business, you have to go through them like a check-list. They're critical. 

a. Gross Margin Model. Does the company cover the costs of making the goods by the price it charges for them? i.e., Does its business allow it to create a gross profit? Again, elementary, right? Sure, but there are so many things you can learn by watching a company's gross margin. 

For some early-stage and growing companies, sometimes they won't produce a gross margin despite having demand for their products. Their costs for acquiring and transporting materials might be too high, but it will go down as they hit scale and can procure raw materials in high volumes. 

A declining gross margin can show that a business is being attacked by the competition and must therefore reduce prices so it doesn't lose customers. It makes you ask the important questions about competitive advantage.

An increasing gross margin might suggest that the company has some form of pricing power where it can raise prices without losing market share. Maybe its brand is just that good. 

Gross margin is the highest line-item of profit on the income statement, and it's the one that can be least manipulated by accounting tricks. It's the pure one that can tell you a lot about what's happening with a business, so it's worth paying attention to.

b. Operating Margin Model. From the gross profit (above), a company will subtract its operating expenses (overhead, marketing, selling, etc.) to come up with an operating profit. What I'm looking for here is that the business can cover its operating expenses with the amount of gross profit it generates. For a mature business, this is the true sign of control over expenses. Discipline. It also gives you the first hint of what the company might have left over to reinvest in itself or to payout stakeholders (the government, owners of its debt, and then owners of its equity).

c. Net Margin Model. This is the bottom line number. Though it should tell us what the business should have left over the payout to shareholders, accounting standards actually force us to spend time with the statement of cash flows and balance sheet to really figure out that number. Consider it a discussion for another long, boring email. Suffice it to say, the net margin model is really forcing us to look at required debt payments to see if it leaves anything over to pay equity owners. 

d. Return on Invested Capital Model. I've left the most important - and least understood - one for last. It, too, would require its own lengthy discussion. While everyone spends their time frittering away on a-c above, they forget (or just don't know) that the true sign of economic viability is a company's ability to produce earnings in excess of the amount of capital that is invested in the business...and the amount of money that must be reinvested in the business over time so it can maintain its competitive position. 

Back to Mad Men and the Jaguar example...The nature of earnings for automobile companies tends to be cyclical, high in good economies and low in bad. When the economy is especially bad, car companies have a very hard time scaling back their operations (reducing costs) so they don't bleed out all the profits they accumulated in the good times. Scaling back, unfortunately, tends to mean laying off a lot of employees. That's why you have governments stepping in for bail-outs. They're far less interested in whether GM, Chrysler (or Jaguar in the 70s) survive as viable businesses and much more interested that 1. important union constituents aren't out of jobs and 2. that the unemployment of massive workforces won't lead to a ripple effect in the economy, making a vicious downward spiral. Those are important points to understand in terms of the nature of Jaguar's earnings.

For its return on invested capital model, the auto companies engage in high-stakes combat with each other that involves putting obscene amounts of capital to work in building and maintaining production lines in their factories. The constant competition led them to create new models for nearly all their cars every year, and to introduce brand new models every few years. Each time they do that, they must invest capital to change or completely overhaul their production lines. And these are HUGE investments that don't always create the most reliable returns. (Some car lines succeed, others are black holes.)

That additional invested capital they plow back into the business would otherwise go to shareholders in the form of dividends or share buybacks or acquisitions that generate more earnings in the future. Instead, they must put all that money back in the business in a way that doesn't necessarily even create more earnings in the future. It's the worst kind of heavy capital reinvestment...the kind you must make just keep running in place, to stop competitors from taking market share from you.

Even while those car companies might produce a tidy profit in any given year, the brutal truth is that shareholders will probably see very little of it. The car companies must hold onto it (retained earnings) and reinvest it back into the business even though it won't necessarily make for bigger earnings in the future.

That's the nature of a capital intensive business. Over periods of several years, its return on invested capital model will demonstrate that it's not a very good place to invest money. Because you just don't get much of it back... 

If a company can invest capital in itself and produce higher earnings as a result (and I mean higher than you think a reasonable investor could get by putting the cash into a safe investment somewhere else), than you're onto something good. That means it passes this measure of profitability. It can grow and create value in doing so. It will be worth more further down the line than it is now.

If it invests money in itself while the earnings stay the same or shrink, it fails this test. It's probably not worth investing in. Hell, it's likely to be out of business before too long.

4. (For investment purposes)...Does the price make sense?

The three questions above help you establish whether or not the company is a high quality business. This last one tells you whether or not the business is worthy of your investment. Even the highest quality businesses (those with growing earnings, durable competitive advantages, and economic models that make sense) can be priced so high that they don't make sense as an investment. That happens all the time.

The price question forces you to combine elements of what you discovered answering all the questions above. In the end, the value of a company is roughly what cash you can expect to get out of it over the long-term. Once you estimate the value (and since it involves predicting the future using very complex variables, it's NEVER a precise number), you see if the market is offering the company to you at a price that's comfortably below that value.

a. Flat Earnings. If the framework questions demonstrate that the nature of the company's earnings are flat (neither growing nor shrinking), plus protected by some combination of competitive advantages, plus they don't have to reinvest tons of their earnings into keeping the company going (i.e., their economic models make sense)...then you've learned a lot and can probably make a good guess about its value and therefore what you should be willing to pay for it. 

In the above scenario (flat but protected earnings), I would generally pay something around 7x earnings. These tend to be cash cow companies, and since the markets recognize them as steady and true producers of cash, they don't tend to have much fluctuation in the stock price. But because they're so predictable, they tend to fetch premiums above that 7x mark. You have to be patient and prepared to catch them trading for what you want.

b. Shrinking Earnings. If the framework demonstrates shrinking earnings, be very careful. All you know for sure is that the value of the company is in decline, but rarely will you know how quickly the decline happens. Think GameStop again. I'm an investor even though the business will necessarily shrink over time. How can that possibly make sense? Because the price of owning it is low when compared to what the company is paying me while it shrinks. It's market share is currently a bit over $2 billion. As of yesterday, it offers a 5.5% dividend and has committed essentially all the earnings/cash it generates over the next two years to paying dividends and buying back stock. It estimates that amount to be $2 billion, meaning if the stock price stays where it is...GameStop management says it will essentially buy back the whole company using its cash flow.

Except in situations like these, I shy away from shrinking earnings. Unless you REALLY know the company and its market, it's like trying to catch a falling knife...chances are good you'll cut yourself up when you grab it.

c. Cyclicals and Blockbusters. I tend to shy away from these unless I really understand the business, the industry, and the cycles in which they operate. The trick here is to have the discipline to only buy at a low point in the cycle or in a non-blockbuster year (but you anticipate - with good reason - that the company will produce more block busters in the future). Never, ever, ever buy at the high point of earnings. You'll overpay and get burned when the earnings drop.

d. Growing Earnings. A business with growing earnings, protected by durable competitive advantages, and with profitable economic models (especially when it comes to returns on invested capital) is the holy grail. These are the compounding machines that take capital in, apply the eighth wonder of the world, and make that capital really grow. Most investors, naturally, want their money with these companies, and so they tend to be overpriced. Sometimes to ridiculous levels.

Take Amazon.com for a moment. Today the market values it at 240 per share. That's about 300 times its reported earnings over the previous 12 months. Ludicrous, right? Probably. I mean, you know I'm fascinated by this business. Its earnings will undoubtedly grow over time. (They're currently depressed because of all of Amazon's investments in growth.) It has low-cost, low-price, network, and brand competitive advantages protecting its earnings. It's hard to see someone being able to take those away. And its economic model is profitable, especially for returns on invested capital (despite the depressed earnings, it invests very little capital to create higher earnings). 

But to pay 300 times earnings is a tough pill to swallow. It requires that you assume the current earnings will grow at a rate (and for an extended period of time) that very few large companies have ever accomplished. Not an impossible feat, mind you. But tough. 

So here's my investing prime directive, a sub-heading of the "price question" in this framework... 

Never, EVER buy anything when the market is optimistic about its future prospects. Only buy in pessimism, and preferably in dark pessimism. 

(See the Buffett quote at the end of this article.) 

I still want high quality companies, but I want to buy them when the price is depressed. This creates a margin of safety for your investment. For Amazon, people are very heady on that business right now. They understand its dominant position in web retailing, and they see how it's expanding its competitive advantages. But Amazon's earnings are bumpy. Not in a bad way, but in a way that's just natural for a fast-growth business. The market HATES bumpy earnings, and if it sees a couple of quarters of falling earnings it may decide that a downward trend is in play and quickly change from optimism from dark pessimism about its fortunes. When that happens, the stock tanks. 

I'm on the sidelines of Amazon, knowing that it will likely show a loss in next quarter's earnings report, just waiting for the optimism to turn dark. When/if that happens, that current 300x earnings valuation will likely drop in breath-taking fashion. Which will create an buying opportunity for anyone that has studied the business and understands it according to the framework above...anyone who recognizes that its earnings will grow substantially over time, be protected from competitors, and show a nice return on invested capital. 

But it takes a strong stomach to buy even the highest quality companies when the market says they're junk.

The best way to use the framework questions is to lay it on top of any company that you want to understand better, practice using it, and make sure to consider the questions in an intertwining (as opposed to "siloed") way. In other words, the answers to one question will help you better understand the answers to another question. 

So, what's the next Mad Men case study?

Thursday, February 16, 2012

The Fanatic - An Investing Construct

The Fanatic, as profiled in this previous post, is a construct to apply to all investing opportunities. Two vantage points to consider:

Vantage Point One - Is the business you're evaluating run by a fanatic? 

This presents its own set of opportunities and challenges that I won't go into here. Suffice it to say, investing with fanatics requires that you possess a deep conviction in the upside of the opportunity for market growth, the fanatic's ability to win that growth, and his ability to win it in a way that provides suitable returns on capital over the long-term. 

As the profile suggests, fanatics will not show many traits of shareholder friendliness while engaged in the thrall of winning market share from the competition. 

Vantage Point Two- Can the business you're evaluating survive attacks by the fanatic? 

This the more common construct you'll use in evaluating investment opportunities. It forces you to understand the deepest competitive advantage of any business by forcing your thinking process outside the simplistic world of rationally-motivated agents. 

A rational agent competitor will work through MBA uber-logic in determining whether and how to compete with your business.

Ponder this...

A. How protected is your potential investment in the face of a capable fanatic using a workable business model and backed by financial resources? Assume he is willing to run through his capital in his attempts to gain an initial toehold and that he will not be bought out...he is shooting for market dominance. How can your business win against him and/or limit his damage?

B. How much pain can your potential business endure in its fight against the fanatic? If the fight involves a price war, how deep is your advantage? Are other shareholders willing to forego the immediate gratification of earnings growth in order to invest in protection against the fanatic, or will they run for the exits and force down the share price?

Imagine you are Kmart when Sam Walton comes along. Or Barnes & Noble facing off against Jeff Bezos. What are some other examples?

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

The Fanatic - A Profile

How does a business compete against a true fanatic?
+
A fanatic with a winning model?
+
A fanatic with access to resources?


The fanatic is, by definition, either oblivious to criticism - so convinced his path is correct - or he is constitutionally impervious to its effects.

He is NOT a rational player who sticks to conventional rules or employs conventional tactics. He has a higher threshold for pain, does not keep banker's hours, and revels in keeping foes off balance. 

The fanatic chooses a path, making appropriate corrections as he proceeds, and sticks to it with stubborn resolve.

The fanatic is unrelenting in pursuit of his goals. He ignores short-term pain while maintaining focus on the long-term vision.

At first competitors ignore him. They are attacked constantly by quirky entrepreneurs. 99 percent of them fall away on their own, collapsing because of flaws in their models or from being starved of resources needed to establish their businesses. Established competitors have neither the time nor the inclination to worry about the upstarts.  

However, the fanatic's long-term vision (or model) is correct. 

He flies under the radar long enough to establish a toe-hold. He now has some staying power. 

Competitors take notice. They hope to stop him with overwhelming force. His model is exposing flaws in their own, but they have neither the time nor the inclination to change that which brought so much success in the past.

The fanatic has access to resources. He can survive attacks. He can grow his business. And he does not play nice when competing. 

Competitors try to buy the fanatic. But he is not a rational player. He believes he is building something great.

The fanatic steals market share and expands the market. He reaches scale and benefits from the economies. He plows all available capital back into the business, paying no dividend, never buying back stock. 

Competitors are back on their heels. They now need better resources to compete. They come to regret the idea of total shareholder returns. 

Competitors test their resolve and contemplate angering their institutional investors...In the interest of beating the fanatic, they ask, can we break our long-standing trend of quarter-over-quarter EPS growth to increase our marketing spend or to hire the people we need or to invest more maintenance capital into the business?  Investors say no.

Competitors contemplate reducing their long-standing dividend payments. Investors say no.

Competitors contemplate suspending their buy-back initiatives. Investors say no.

All the while, the fanatic is unrelenting in his attack.

Saturday, January 21, 2012

Hasbro (HAS): Part Three - Circles Competence

Whatever your impressions of Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks among other business ventures,  you should read what he has to say at blog maverick. Several years ago he posted an entry called "How to Get Rich." When a billionaire offers that brand of advice, my ears tend to perk up. His advice did not disappoint. I'll quote liberally...

"The 2nd rule for getting rich is getting smart. Investing your time in yourself and becoming knowledgeable about the business of something you really love to do...Before or after work and on weekends, every single day, read everything there is to read about the business. Go to trade shows, read the trade magazines, spend a lot of time talking to the people you do business with about their business and the people they buy from. This is not a short term project. We aren't talking days. We aren't talking months. We are talking years. Lots of years and maybe decades. I didn't say this was a get rich quick scheme. This is a get rich path.
Now you wait for times of uncertainty and change in your business. The time will come. It may come quickly, it may take years and years. But it will come. The nature of our country's business infrastructure is that it is destined to be boom and bust. Booms are when the smart people sell. Busts are when the rich people started on their path to wealth. You will know when that time is here for you because you will know your business inside and out. You will be ready because you will have been saving up for this moment in time...
...Booms and busts happen in every industry. The question is whether you have the discipline to be ready when it happens for you? If you do, you will find out what it feels like to get lucky."
He speaks of developing deep competence in an industry by coming to know it intimately...understanding its rhythms, its cycles, its strengths, and its weaknesses. It supersedes number crunching and other forms of strictly quantitative analysis, so it's the sort of knowledge that tends to evade Wall Street pros.  It's  awareness that bolsters your confidence to push your chips in when others are folding and heading for the exits. Because you've studied this industry. You recognize what customers want and when customers buy. You have learned when a dip in earnings is signal of actual trouble for the business and when it's just a temporary blip...just part of the cycle. 

Investors are well-served getting to know particular industries as Cuban describes and making bets when they know the odds are stacked heavily in their favor. And while most of us don't have the luxury of being quite so parsimonious with our investments, the spirit of this as a mental model can be applied to our own disciplined approaches. 

Two things come to mind as I think through the Hasbro opportunity. First, can I sift through the avalanche of input that represents my research on the company and tease from it the few relevant pieces of information that give me the best shot at understanding its future? These are the business drivers...the variables that have an outsized impact. Second, can I buy it cheap enough that the low price - in and of itself - reduces my downside risk? This I need in case I didn't identify the right drivers or somehow convinced myself I was operating in an area I could comprehend when in fact it was beyond my abilities.

My Hasbro research will take me through several years worth of annual reports, financial statements, investor presentations, quarterly earnings update transcripts, and media features on the executive team. In my experience, if you dive into all this data without a goal of what you're trying to understand, it will confuse you, confound you, and otherwise leave your head spinning in all directions. 

To develop a baseline of competence on Hasbro and the toy industry in a reasonable amount of time, I must start with some questions or themes to frame my research. That's where we go next...

Friday, January 20, 2012

Hasbro (HAS): Part Two - Quick & Dirty Stab at Valuation

So I'm attracted to Hasbro because it appears relatively cheap at around 11x price-to-net earnings, has a respectable 10-year track record (per Morningstar's collection of its financial data), and has stable of toy brands that look strong, many of which I remember loving as a child.

We start off by listening to a Mattel presentation on the merits of the toy industry. It suggests good growth opportunities and stability through the roughest times. The past is no guarantee of future performance, but it's a pretty good place to start. I'm much more at ease extrapolating a long history of good performance into expectations for the future than I am looking at track record of bad results and expecting the business to change. So we invest a little more time to see where our research takes us.

In mid-2010 I created a humble model, a stress test of sorts, through which I would run prospective investment opportunities to see if they present a comfortable margin of safety. In simplified manner, it works something like this:

First, I look at the business's growth rates over the past seven to ten years, paying particular attention to owner earnings it generates (more or less operating income plus depreciation minus taxes minus interest minus my estimates for cash needed for maintenance capex and maintenance working capital growth) and what it does with those earnings  (i.e., does it let it accumulate as cash reserves? plow it back into the business? use it for acquisitions? pay it out as dividends? buy back shares?). Most importantly, I want to see whether owner earnings are growing at a healthy clip, staircasing in an up and to-the-right trajectory, and being used in shareholder friendly ways. 

Then I calculate the compounded annual growth rate of the owner earnings AND CUT IT IN HALF to build a margin of safety into my assumptions as early as possible. I apply that growth rate to the last full year numbers from the business. If it were to grow at my calculated rate, I want to know what its overall owner earnings will be five years from my initial investment. 

Let's just go ahead and use Hasbro as an example. Using fiscal year 2010 numbers, I calculate its owner earnings to be $360 million. Its compounded annual growth rate since 2003 has been 10.1 percent, so I'm going to use 5.05 percent in my conservative estimates. Meaning, at the end of 2015, its owner earnings would be $460 million. 

I assume that after paying dividends and reinvesting back into the business, excess cash will go to share repurchases. Without getting into all of those details now, my calculation is that Hasbro's outstanding shares would drop from 129 million today to 108 million at end of 2015. A quick bit of division and I see that Hasbro would generate 4.24 in owner earnings per share at the end of five years. 

Now I apply a multiple that those earnings. Most value investors would be aghast at this practice. After all, you should never try to guess the mind of Mr. Market! I find it no more arbitrary than trying to calculate business performance out to infinity by running a formal discounted cash flow analysis. Hasbro's current multiple is about 12. A quick look at its historic owner earnings multiple shows that it has ranged - on the low side - from 11.8x to 36.9x over the past nine years. That makes me feel comfortable that 12x is plenty conservative for my margin of safety needs. I'll use it.

So 12 times 4.24 gives me a conservative share value of 50.90. Now I add back accumulated dividends, assuming that Hasbro will continue paying out at its recent rate of 36 percent of owner earnings. I think that's pretty conservative since it means the five year dividend growth rate will only be about five percent (the same as owner earning growth rate for obvious reasons) instead of its historical 26 percent compounded rate. 

The dividends are 6.41 plus the share value of 50.90 gives me a total value of 57.31. Starting at about 33 per share today, that means the value will appreciate a total of 73.7 percent or on a compounded annual basis of 11.7 percent.


Now, where should we start quibbling about the errors in calculation or thought process? They are plenty. The point, however, is to make a quick and dirty stab at valuing the business five years hence using conservative assumptions. Each step of my process is meant to lead to an easy way to screen out investment candidates that don't merit more of my research time. Hasbro passed the early tests, meaning I thought it worthy of investing an hour to push it through this margin of safety stress test.

What do I want to discover from this stress test? That the conservative inputs suggest the likelihood of a satisfactory return for my investment. I'm not looking to thread the needle with businesses promising only  marginal upside after making ambitious assumptions of their performance. I'm looking for meaningful compounded growth after chopping their growth prospects down to earth.  As a prominent investor once said (and I paraphrase), it should be so obvious you could drive a truck through it.

Rough calculations suit my needs at this stage.

Hasbro shows promise of about 12 percent compounded growth in this test. Since the business has modest needs for reinvested capital, the bulk of the benefit comes from using owner earnings to payout investors via dividends and share repurchases. I prefer to see a clear and easy path to 15 percent compounded returns, but my impression is that Hasbro is of high enough quality that I can invest my time and take it to the next stage of research.



Thursday, January 19, 2012

Hasbro (HAS): Part One - My Intro to the Toy Industry

Flipping through some 52-week low stock screens I run across Hasbro (HAS), see its relatively low P/E at 11, its comfortable dividend yield at 3.6 percent, and decide to dig in for a closer look. Here's a first blush check list that tells me its worthy of investing some time...

1. 10-year historical information at Morningstar shows decent performance in revenue growth and operating income while maintaining a respectable return on invested capital and a much better return on equity.

2. A glance at its balance sheet shows growing debt levels but the cash flows show no problem covering interest payments. 

3. Its statement of cash flows demonstrates a commitment to returning cash to investors in the form of consistent and growing dividend payments along with plenty of share repurchases over the past several years. Its need for capex is pretty low when compared to its cash generating abilities.

4. And finally, its website shows that it owns and/or licenses some real franchise brands like Transformers, G.I. Joe, Star Wars, Nerf, Monopoly, etc. I like strong brands. 

This looks promising, but I know almost nothing about the toy industry. I need to educate myself. Strangely enough, one of the first places I end up spending time is the investor relations page of arch rival Mattel where I start reading its Analyst Day presentation from October 2011 which attempts to answer these three questions: Why toys? Why Mattel? and Why now?

Seems a good place to start.

Mattel management presents a reasonable thesis that appears grounded in facts. Here are the key points:

  • The global toy market is growing, sporting a respectable 2.1 percent CAGR since 2007 despite strikes, recessions and epidemics and showing no reason it would slow down soon.
  • There are more kids today then ever before, and mothers keep popping 'em out.
  • Grandparents are growing as a demographic, and they spend $52 billion a year on their grandkids in the U.S. alone. As true a fact as you'll ever read...Grandparents are the biggest suckers the toy industry could ever hope for!
  • The middle class is growing like crazy in developing countries and more disposable income creates the desire to spoil your kids with brand-named toys.
  • The toy industry is largely recession resistant, actually growing during the 2001-2003 recession and doing five percent better than the rest of the S&P 500 during the 2008-2009 recession. Not to mention toys outperformed most other forms of discretionary consumer spending when things got tight for shoppers.


The gist of the rest...Mattel is very shareholder friendly with its cash, has incredible toy brands along with strong licensing partners, and it's poised to knock the proverbial ball out of the proverbial park as consumer wallets start opening up again.

Few senior executives make it to their high-salaried positions without honing some sales skills along the way. And as I finished listening to the Mattel presentation, I was ready to speed-dial my broker and grab me a slice of that pie. I like good brands! I like demographic tailwinds! I like global growth! I like shareholder friendly management!

Alas, it was trading at a premium to Hasbro (14x to 11x) and was much nearer to a 52-week high than Hasbro's low. Plus, I have a hard and fast rule about making impulsive investment decisions. I set out to evaluate Hasbro and the toy industry. Let's just digest this information for a night and see where our efforts lead us tomorrow.